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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 










MONROE E. BULLOCK, a/k/a Munchie 
 
     Monroe E. Bullock,  
                                                                    Appellant  
__________________________________  
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Crim. No. 2-95-cr-00296-002) 
District Judge: Paul S. Diamond 
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal for Lack of Appellate Jurisdiction or  
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
July 16, 2015 
 
Before:  FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR. and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 








 Monroe Bullock appeals from an order of the District Court denying his Rule 36 





 Bullock was convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21 
U.S.C. § 846, following a jury trial in 1996.  As set forth in the presentence report 
(“PSR”), the United States Probation Office calculated an adjusted offense level for 
trafficking in crack cocaine of 44, and Bullock was placed in criminal history category 
III.  The resulting Guidelines range was life imprisonment, and, at the sentencing hearing, 
the District Court adopted the Guidelines calculation set forth in the PSR and imposed a 
sentence of life imprisonment.  We affirmed on direct appeal, see C.A. No. 96-1639, and 
the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. 
 In September 1998, Bullock filed a motion to vacate sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 
2255, raising numerous claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, 
including one concerning the failure of trial counsel to require the Government to prove 
that the substance sold was crack cocaine and not some other form of cocaine base.  In an 
order entered on February 9, 1999, the District Court denied the § 2255 motion on the 
merits.  We then denied Bullock’s request for a certificate of appealabilty, see C.A. No. 
99-1175.   
 Thereafter, Bullock sought to challenge his drug trafficking conviction and 
sentence through a variety of means, including a mandamus petition, a Rule 60(b) 
motion, an independent action pursuant to Rule 60(b)’s savings clause, and applications 
in this Court to file a second or successive § 2255 motion.  None of these efforts were 
successful.  But, on September 24, 2008, the District Court reduced Bullock’s sentence to 
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360 months pursuant to Amendment 706, which reduced the base offense level for crack 
cocaine, see U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1; 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), by two levels.  Bullock then 
sought another reduction in sentence in 2013 pursuant to Amendment 591, which 
clarified that the Guidelines section used to set the base offense level must correspond 
with the actual offense of conviction, see United States v. Diaz, 245 F.3d 294, 301 (3d 
Cir. 2001).  The District Court denied this motion because the correct Guidelines section 
was used to calculate Bullock’s base offense level. 
 On July 25, 2014, Bullock filed a motion to correct clerical errors pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.  In his Rule 36 motion, Bullock argued that there 
are “clerical errors” that need to be corrected, pertaining to whether or not the controlled 
substance that he conspired to distribute was crack cocaine, in (1) the District Court’s 
memorandum opinion denying his § 2255 motion; (2) the District Court’s order denying 
his 2013 motion for reduction of sentence; and (3) the PSR.  Bullock once again claimed 
that the Government did not introduce sufficient evidence that he conspired to distribute 
crack cocaine and not some other form of cocaine base.  In an order entered on December 
17, 2014, the District Court denied the motion as meritless.  Bullock filed his notice of 
appeal from the District Court’s decision on March 25, 2015. 
 Upon the docketing of Bullock’s appeal in this Court, our Clerk notified the 
parties that it appeared that the appeal was untimely filed under Federal Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 4(a)(1)(B) (providing for 60-day appeal period when United States is a party).  
The parties also were advised that we might take summary action on the appeal if no 
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substantial question was presented by it.  The parties were invited to submit responses 
and they have done so.  We have considered those responses. 
 We find that appellate jurisdiction is not lacking.  The time period provided for 
criminal appeals, Fed. R. App. 4(b)(1)(A) (fourteen days), applies here because the only 
rule permitting the relief Bullock sought – the correction of clerical errors – is a rule of 
criminal procedure.  Bullock filed a motion in the District Court for equitable tolling of 
the Rule 4(b) appeal period, asserting that he did not timely receive a copy of the District 
Court’s order denying his Rule 36 motion.  In response, the Government advised the 
District Court that it would not seek to enforce the Rule 4(b) time limit, noting correctly 
that it is not a jurisdictional requirement, but rather a “claim-processing” rule.  
Government of Virgin Islands v. Martinez, 620 F.3d 321, 327-29 (3d Cir. 2010).  On this 
basis, the District Court denied Bullock’s motion for an extension of time to appeal as 
moot.  Accordingly, because Rule 4(b) is a “claim-processing” rule and the Government 
has elected not to enforce it, we will not dismiss the appeal as untimely filed, id.  We 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 We will summarily affirm the order of the District Court because no substantial 
question is presented by this appeal, Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.  The 
District Court properly denied Bullock’s Rule 36 motion.  Rule 36 provides that, “[a]fter 
giving any notice it considers appropriate, the court may at any time correct a clerical 
error in a judgment, order, or other part of the record, or correct an error in the record 
arising from oversight or omission.”  Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 36.  This rule is limited: it 
permits courts to correct only clerical errors -- that is, “a failure to accurately record a 
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statement or action by the court or one of the parties.”  United States v. Bennett, 423 F.3d 
271, 278 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  “[A] clerical 
error ‘must not be one of judgment or even of misidentification, but merely of recitation, 
of the sort that a clerk or amanuensis might commit, mechanical in nature.’”  United 
States v. Guevremont, 829 F.2d 423, 426 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting Dura-Wood Treating 
Co. v. Century Forest Indus., 694 F.2d 112, 114 (5th Cir. 1982)).  The references in the 
two District Court opinions/orders and PSR that Bullock conspired to distribute crack 
cocaine are not clerical errors.  There was no failure to accurately record a statement or 
action by the District Court or one of the parties arising from an oversight or omission, 
and Rule 36 may not be used to challenge the sufficiency of the District Court’s findings 
at sentencing. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the order of the District Court 
denying Bullock’s Rule 36 motion.  
